Review of members` implementing rules Members must inform the TRIPS Council of their relevant laws and regulations. This will help the Council to review the functioning of the agreement. It was therefore argued that the TRIPS standard, which required all countries to establish rigorous IP systems, would be detrimental to the development of poorer countries. [13] [14] It has been argued that, in the strategic interest of most, if not all, underdeveloped nations, it is to use the flexibility available in TRIPS to adopt IP laws that are as weak as possible. [15] Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Annex 1C to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization of 15 April 1994); See gattt secretariat, results of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, Legal Texts 365 et seq. (1994), www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#wtoagreement (accessed 25 November 2003). TRIPS was negotiated in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) from 1986 to 1994. Its inclusion was the culmination of an intensive lobbying program by the United States, supported by the European Union, Japan and other developed countries. Unilateral economic support campaigns under the Generalized System of Preferences and coercion under Section 301 of the Trade Act have played an important role in suppressing competing political positions favoured by developing countries such as Brazil, but also Thailand, India and the Caribbean Basin countries.

The U.S. strategy to link trade policy to intellectual property standards can in turn be attributed to the entrepreneurial spirit of Pfizer`s management in the early 1980s, which mobilized companies in the United States and made the maximization of intellectual property privileges the top priority of U.S. trade policy (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000, Chapter 7). Information on intellectual property in the WTO, new and official registrations of the activities of the TRIPS Council and details of the WTO`s cooperation with other international organizations in this field: according to TRIPS, industrialized countries should have fully implemented the Agreement by 1 January 1996. Developing countries and members in transition to a market economy have had the right to postpone until 1 January 2000 the full implementation of ad hoc obligations. Least developed members had until 1 January 2006 to implement their commitments, with the possibility of a further transition upon request. Developing countries that, at the time of their application, did not grant patent protection for certain fields of technology were granted a further five-year period, until 1 January 2005, to ensure such protection. In November 2005, the 2006 transition period for the least developed countries was extended until 1 July 2013. Daniele Archibugi and Andrea Filippetti[34] argue that the importance of TRIPS in the process of generating and disseminating knowledge and innovation has been overestimated by its proponents. This has been supported by the United Nations` findings, which indicate that many low-protection countries currently benefit from significant foreign direct investment (FDI).

[35] Analysis of OECD countries in the 1980s and 1990s (during which the patent term of medicines was extended by 6 years) showed that, although the total number of registered products increased slightly, the average innovation index remained unchanged. [36] In contrast, Jörg Baten, Nicola Bianchi and Petra Moser (2017)[37] find historical evidence that, in certain circumstances, compulsory licensing – a key mechanism for weakening intellectual property rights under Article 31 of TRIPS – can indeed be effective in promoting inventions by increasing the threat of competition in low-reserve areas. . . .

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